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1.1  Background 
Since it was first enacted in 1935, social security has been enormously 
successful in improving the financial condition of the disabled and the 
elderly. Despite this success, however, demographic trends make change 
inevitable. As the baby boom generation approaches retirement and lon- 
gevity increases, social security faces a funding shortfall. The accumula- 
tion of surplus, now being built up, is currently projected to be exhausted 
by  the year 2032, and social security actuaries project that, during the 
seventy-five-year period used  to project  revenues and benefits, a deficit 
equal to 2.19 percent of taxable earnings will occur. 
Reflecting social security’s extraordinary success and universal accep- 
tance, most reform proposals start from the same fundamental premise: 
the system must maintain disability and survivor benefits and continue to 
provide a guaranteed benefit that keeps both the disabled and the elderly 
out of poverty. Consistent with these goals, and in order to achieve a 
broader participation in capital markets, especially by low- and moderate- 
wage workers, many recent proposals also embrace the idea of adding a 
defined-contribution feature in the form of personal retirement accounts 
(PRAs) that would be owned and controlled by individual workers.’ Poll- 
ing data also suggest strong public support for making individual accounts 
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1. See, e.g., National Commission on Retirement Policy (1998); Report of  I994-1996  Advi- 
sory Council on Social Security (1997); and legislation introduced in the 105th Congress by 
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a part of  social security.2  There are many variations on this theme, and 
PRA proponents justify their support on a wide variety of grounds: Over 
extended periods, PRAs should generate higher returns than the Social 
Security Trust Fund, thereby helping maintain  adequate retirement in- 
come. PRAs will provide a source of financial wealth (and stock market 
returns) to the roughly half of Americans who have none aside from the 
promised benefits of social security. Unlike the Social Security Trust Fund, 
the money in  PRAs is  “walled off” and cannot be used to fund other 
government expenditures; unlike social security benefits, PRAs are owned 
by individual participants and represent vested property rights. Social se- 
curity is a pure defined-benefit program that is of most value to those who 
live the longest, while PRAs represent assets that are owned by  partici- 
pants; PRAs could be of particular benefit to the families of those who 
die early and groups with short life expectancies (e.g., minorities and low- 
income  workers).  Because  single individuals, single parents,  and  two- 
income married couples are relatively disadvantaged by the way in which 
social security benefits are computed, PRAs may be of particular benefit 
to those groups. PRAs will provide a universal infrastructure to promote 
savings and help create wealth for all Americans. 
To  date, the PRA discussion has focused principally on policies and 
politics; not much has been written on ways in which to implement and 
administer such a program. The purpose of this paper is to address this 
latter question. While not a glamorous topic, the mechanics of PRAs will 
have a major effect on whether they become a part of this nation’s national 
retirement policy. PRAs may be good policy and good politics, but, if they 
cannot work, they will not happen. 
In addition, the ability to implement PRAs at a reasonable administra- 
tive cost is critical to their ultimate success. Large administrative expenses 
have the potential to erode the earnings of PRAs substantially, particu- 
larly for the large number of relatively small accounts that will exist.3  Thus, 
a workable low-cost system is widely accepted as a prerequisite for the 
successful implementation of PRAs. 
Senators Moynihan and Kerrey (S. 1792), Gregg and Breaux (S. 2313), Roth (S. 2369), and 
Grams (S. 2552) and Representatives Porter (H.R. 2929), N. Smith (H.R. 3082), and Kolbe 
and Stenholm (H.R. 4824). Other countries have already reformed their national retirement 
policies to implement PRAs (see app. A). 
2. For example, 67 percent of the respondents to a poll conducted on behalf of the Demo- 
cratic Leadership Council in August 1998 would prefer setting up PRAs. When asked about 
the risk of stock market downturns, which could diminish the value of PRAs, 55 percent of 
the respondents to the same poll still would prefer PRAs. Similarly, results from an August 
1998 poll conducted on behalf of Americans Discuss Social Security indicate that approxi- 
mately 58 percent of respondents with an opinion on proposals to reform social security by 
creating PRAs reacted favorably to such proposals. 
3. Some have proposed direct investment of Social Security Trust Funds in stocks and 
bonds. While this change would achieve some of the advantages of PRAs, it would fail to 
achieve others and raises important additional questions. A discussion of this alternative is 
beyond the scope of this paper. We  do recognize, however, that the cost of administering 
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While the PRA policy options are legion, our approach has been de- 
signed to satisfy three basic administrative criteria: (1) to minimize admin- 
istrative costs and distribute those costs in a fair and reasonable way; (2) to 
minimize the burden on employers, especially small employers who do not 
now maintain a qualified retirement plan; and (3) to meet the expectations 
of everyday Americans for simplicity, security, control, and independence 
in ways that are easy to explain and easy to understand. While PRAs raise 
difficult administrative issues, this paper demonstrates that they can work. 
It  describes  a  practical  system  for  implementing  and  administering 
PRAs-a  system that fulfills the three criteria listed above. 
While these three criteria are generally accepted, there is a fourth re- 
quirement that has not been considered by  other commentators but has 
influenced the design that we  describe. Because the policy and political 
debate over PRAs is just getting started in earnest, there is a premium on 
flexibility-the  capacity to accommodate a wide range of funding options 
and policy objectives. The system that we describe here will work whether 
PRAs are mandatory or voluntary; whether PRAs are funded by allocat- 
ing an existing portion of the payroll tax to PRAs (a so-called carve-out), 
funded by collecting an additional amount from workers and/or employ- 
ers (a so-called add-on), or funded from general revenues; whether or not 
PRAs are partially integrated with social security to help cover the fund- 
ing shortfall when baby boomers begin to retire; regardless of how ad- 
ministrative costs are funded (in particular, regardless of what costs are 
funded from general revenues); regardless of the rights that spouses and 
ex-spouses have with  respect  to PRAs  (e.g., some suggest  that  PRAs 
should  be divided  from the  outset  between the worker  and  his or her 
spouse); whether or not workers are allowed to make additional, voluntary 
contributions to their PRAs; and whatever investment and distribution 
options are available to participants and however those options are regu- 
lated. The system that we  describe would accommodate a wide range of 
potential answers to these policy issues. Of equal importance, the system 
would be flexible enough to accommodate changes in the ways in  which 
these questions are answered over time, after  the PRA program is  put 
in place. 
1.2  Overview 
The most important point to keep in mind is size-both  big and little. 
The PRA system will  involve an enormous number of accounts, and, in 
many of those accounts, the dollar amounts will  be quite small. For ex- 
ample, approximately 137 million workers would have been covered dur- 
ing 1996.4  Table 1.1 presents the number of those covered workers at vari- 
4. The term covered workers refers to workers who participate in the social security system 12  Fred T.  Goldberg Jr. and Michael J.  Graetz 
Table 1.1  Covered Workers 
Workers 
Number  As YO 


































ous levels of covered wages (National Academy of Social Insurance 1998). 
Assuming that the amount going to PRAs each year equaled 2 percent 
of wages covered by social security, accounts for nearly 62 million workers 
would have been credited $300 or less for 1996; accounts for the approxi- 
mately 9 million part-time and seasonal workers making less than $3,000 
would have been credited  with less than $60. At 3 percent  of covered 
wages, nearly 47 million workers would have been credited with $300 or 
less. The average amount of covered wages for 1996 was nearly $25,000. 
Thus, at 2 percent of covered wages, the average amount credited to ac- 
counts for 1996 would have been $500, and the aggregate amount of con- 
tributions for 1996 would have been approximately $68.5 billion. 
This paper focuses on the three fundamental administrative functions 
that are common to all systems of PRAs: (1) collecting PRA funds and 
crediting  funds to each participant’s  retirement  account;  (2)  investing 
funds on behalf of individual participants; and (3) distributing funds from 
PRA accounts to participants and beneficiaries. 
1.3  The PRA Program 
1.3.1  Summary 
Any system of PRAs will provide for the funding of accounts, the man- 
agement and investment of funds, the maintenance and dissemination of 
~~~~~~ 
and are liable for payroll taxes that fund social security and medicare. While most workers 
are covered, there are exceptions-notably,  approximately 3.7 million workers employed by 
state and local governments. The term covered wages refers to wages subject to the payroll 
tax-in  general, wages of covered workers up to a cap of approximately $68,400 in  1998. 
Except as otherwise noted, data are from SSA (1997). A Practical and Workable System of Personal Retirement Accounts  13 
account information, and the distribution of funds on retirement, disabil- 
ity, or death. A brief summary of procedures follows, illustrating how to 
minimize administrative costs and the burden on employers at the same 
time as providing participants with an understandable and workable sys- 
tem that will meet their needs for simplicity, security, independence, and 
control. 
Funding PRAs. The current wage-reporting, payroll-tax, and income-tax 
systems provide an in-place vehicle for collecting PRA funds and crediting 
PRA accounts. Because these systems are already up and running, this 
aspect of the program will cost little to administer, will impose no addi- 
tional burden on employers, and should be relatively easy to explain to 
participating workers. 
Investing PRAs. From the standpoint of investment options, a two-tiered 
approach responds to the need for a simple and inexpensive system and 
meets the desire to provide individuals with control over their PRAs and 
a wide range of investment options. First, all workers could elect to invest 
their PRAs in a limited number of funds sponsored by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) under a “no-frills’’ system managed by the private 
sector (simple personal investment funds [SPIFs]). Alternatively, workers 
could direct that their funds be invested in one or more privately spon- 
sored qualified private funds (Q-funds). Some regulation of Q-funds will 
be necessary to limit investment options (as is now done with IRAs and 
401 [k] plans), to provide for times and methods for shifting investments, 
to ensure the solvency of fund managers, to provide for methods and times 
of disclosures to investors, and to regulate the allocation of administrative 
costs. The Treasury Department and the Labor Department, along with 
the Federal Reserve and the SEC, have long been performing these func- 
tions for private investments and therefore have the expertise and experi- 
ence to implement any necessary regulation of Q-funds. 
Distributing  Funds from PRAs. Workers could not  gain access to their 
PRAs prior to disability, retirement, or death-at  which point it may be 
required that some or all of the PRA funds would have to be annuitized. 
As with the investment options, annuity alternatives should operate under 
a two-tiered approach. Either workers could elect to have their PRA bal- 
ances transferred to the SSA in exchange for an appropriate increase in 
their monthly social security benefits, or, alternatively, workers could use 
their PRA balances to purchase qualified annuities from the private sector. 
Private companies that offer annuities should be required to provide all- 
comers annuities at the same age-based price to reduce costs and limit 
adverse-selection problems. 14  Fred T. Goldberg Jr. and Michael J. Graetz 
1.3.2  Funding PRAs 
In General 
An efficient and flexible mechanism for funding PRAs can be built off 
of the existing wage-reporting, payroll-tax, and income-tax systems. As ex- 
plained below, this approach would involve four basic steps to direct funds 
into a PRA for the benefit of an individual worker. These steps are summa- 
rized below as they apply to employees (comparable procedures would 
apply with respect to self-employed workers). 
Step 1. Employers withhold payroll taxes from wages and deposit those 
taxes (together with the employer’s share) with the IRS, as required under 
current law.  If PRAs are funded through a carve-out of existing payroll 
taxes or from general revenues, no additional collection mechanism would 
be necessary. If, on the other hand, PRAs are funded through  an add- 
on in the form of additional withholding, the additional funds would be 
collected through the existing payroll-tax system in the same manner as 
payroll taxes, but PRA amounts would be designated as such in employ- 
ers’ deposits of withheld taxes and PRA contributions. If PRAs are fi- 
nanced from general revenues, the government would simply transfer the 
appropriate amounts into individuals’ PRAs. 
Step 2. Employers provide employees with W-2 forms at the close of the 
calendar year and file those forms with the IRS, as required under current 
law. If PRAs are funded through a carve-out from existing payroll taxes or 
from general revenues, no additional information would be required from 
employers. If PRAs are funded through an add-on, employers’ W-2 forms 
would include both payroll-tax and PRA information for each employee. 
Step 3. Employees file  1040 forms with the IRS, attaching copies of W-2 
forms, as required under current law. The employee would also indicate 
how to invest amounts to be deposited in the PRA, using a form filed with 
his or her tax return. The IRS would collect the information necessary to 
set up and fund PRAs. (Most of this information, other than workers’ in- 
vestment choices, is already collected by the IRS under current law in the 
processing of tax returns.) 
Step 4. On the basis of  information collected in step 3,  the employee’s 
PRA would be funded as directed or funded as required by  statute if the 
employee does not specify an investment option (presumably, into a speci- 
fied SPIF15 
5.  If a worker’s account is divided from the outset between the worker and his or her 
spouse, then the worker and the worker’s spouse would designate their respective investment 
choices on their joint or separate tax returns. A Practical and Workable System of Personal Retirement Accounts  15 
Step 1  Employer withholds payroll taxes and 
deposits with Federal Government 
1 
s  tep 2  Employer provides Form W -2 to employees 
and files with Federal Government 
Step 3  Employees file Forms 1040, attaching Form 
W -2 and Social Security Personal Retirement 
Account Investment Form; IRS collects 
information to set up and fund PRAs 
Fig. 1.1  Funding PRAs 
Step 4 
The flow of information and funds reflected in these four steps is sum- 
marized in figures 1.1 and 1.2. 
Structuring PRAs around the existing system minimizes administrative 
costs and would impose no significant incremental burden on employers.6 
As under present law, employers would withhold payroll taxes from wages 
paid and would deposit those funds with the IRS according to the appli- 
cable deposit  schedule. Similarly, self-employed individuals would con- 
tinue to make payments of the self-employment tax to the IRS according 
to the applicable payment schedule. Because workers select their invest- 
ment options when they file their tax returns, no additional burden is im- 
posed on employers, and the additional burden on workers is minimized. 
This approach for collecting funds and crediting accounts would minimize 
the costs of initiating a system of PRAs. 
FMS transfers amounts to SPIFs or Q-Funds, 
as directed in Step 3 
6.  As noted below, the task of informing workers regarding the operation and administra- 
tion of  PRAs (including information  and education regarding investment options) should 
be the responsibility of the SSA and other federal agencies. 16  Fred T.  Goldberg Jr. and Michael J. Graetz 
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Fig. 1.2  Flow of funds and information 
Establishing PRAs and Funding Investment Options 
Most of the information necessary to establish and fund each worker’s 
PRA-worker  identifying information (name, social security number, and 
address) and amount of covered wages-is  already provided to the IRS 
through employers’ W-2 forms and by workers filing their tax returns. The 
only additional step would be for each worker to select a particular invest- 
ment option by completing a form that could be filed along with the work- 
er’s tax return. Some proponents of PRAs have expressed concerns that 
workers not have to deal with the IRS in connection with their PRAs. To 
address this concern, the form could be designed and labeled to make clear 
that this is a social security PRA investment form. (Of course, investment 
elections could be required to be made directly with the SSA on a separate 
form apart from tax-return filing, but we  believe that the additional bur- 
den and administrative costs of separate filings are unwarranted.) 
The IRS would gather all the necessary information relevant to PRAs 
as part of its routine processing of tax returns. Because the IRS already 
gathers most of this information, the additional costs of processing the so- 
cial security PRA investment form would not be significant. As now occurs A Practical and Workable System of Personal Retirement Accounts  17 
with respect to tax refunds, the IRS would provide each worker’s  PRA 
information to the Treasury Department’s Financial Management Service 
(FMS). In much the same way in which it handles other funding activities 
on behalf of the federal government, the FMS would then wire transfer 
the  appropriate amount  to each  worker’s  designated investment fund. 
Once again, because the funding mechanism builds on existing systems, 
this approach should minimize the government’s additional cost and facil- 
itate the implementation of PRAs.’ 
Funding accounts in connection with the processing of tax returns, and 
having participants designate their investment choices with those returns, 
accomplishes several objectives: (1) Because substantially all workers al- 
ready file income-tax returns, it minimizes the burden on participants and 
the government’s processing costs (as, e.g., compared to a requirement 
that workers make a separate filing with the SSA). It also minimizes the 
start-up costs that would be associated with other systems of crediting ac- 
counts. (2) It avoids imposing any additional burden  on employers. (3) 
The fact that most employers still file their W-2s with the IRS on paper is 
irrelevant. Paper filing causes no delay, and a very small number of correc- 
tions will have to be made.8 (4) It protects workers’ privacy. (5) Since wage 
reports filed by employers throughout the year do not identify wages allo- 
cable to each employee, the filing of  the worker’s  tax return is  the first 
occasion when the government has the information necessary to fund each 
participant’s account. (6)  Taking the information from the participant’s 
tax return minimizes the lag in f~nding.~  This greatly simplifies crediting 
funds to workers’ accounts because funding takes place once annually, 
rather  than at each pay period.  It also eliminates any need to “credit” 
PRAs for earnings prior to the time at which individual accounts are cred- 
7. The relative ease of this system is illustrated by the following: More than 80 percent of 
all taxpayers already file refund returns, and the IRS and the FMS are generally able to issue 
those refunds within two to four weeks after returns are filed. Moreover, under current law, 
taxpayers may instruct the IRS to issue refunds through direct deposit to a bank account 
owned by  the taxpayer by  including such instructions  on the 1040 form. The information 
required from the taxpayer for this purpose, and the administrative burden on the IRS and 
the FMS, is similar to that which would be required in the context of PRAs. During the 1998 
individual income-tax filing season, approximately 19.1 million individuals-more  than 20 
percent of all those receiving refunds-used  this direct deposit system. Similarly, the increas- 
ing reliance on electronic-funds transfers in other contexts, e.g., the payment of welfare bene- 
fits, also suggests that the system described above can be implemented with relative ease. 
8. Of the more than 1.1 billion information returns filed each year with the IRS, approxi- 
mately 5 million, or less than 0.5 percent, are subsequently corrected. Applying this ratio to 
the more than 223 million W-2 forms actually filed in 1997, all of which were required to be 
filed in magnetic media, in electronic format, or on scannable paper, we expect that only 1 
million W-2 forms would need correction. 
9. For example, in  1998, approximately 32 percent of  all individual returns were filed 
within two months after the end of the year, and approximately 90 percent of all returns 
were filed by  1 May, only four months after the end of the year. It now takes the SSA approxi- 
mately nine months after the end of the year to process most W-2s, and it generally takes 
the IRS and the SSA up to eighteen months to complete reconciliation of W-2s. 18  Fred T.  Goldberg Jr. and Michael J. Graetz 
ited.1° (7) Any discrepancies between amounts reported on individual tax 
returns and amounts reflected through the reconciliation of W-2s by  the 
SSA can be readily rectified through direct adjustments to PRAs. The only 
difficulty that can arise is when a downward adjustment is required to a 
PRA that has been defunded before the discrepancy is discovered. (Even 
in these rare cases, “transferee liability” similar to that now provided un- 
der the tax code could recapture erroneous amounts in virtually all cir- 
cumstances.) (8) The IRS and the FMS experience with refunds generally, 
and with the electronic deposit of tax refunds in particular, demonstrates 
that the funding technology is already in place and can be implemented 
easily. (9) This approach provides maximum flexibility. For example, it is 
well suited to any financing approach (whether through carve-out of pay- 
roll taxes, through additional mandatory contributions, or from general 
revenues) because each funding method  requires the same information 
from participants (worker identification, covered wages,  and investment 
choices). Likewise, using the tax return as an information source has sub- 
stantial advantages in accommodating voluntary additional contributions, 
particularly if those contributions are encouraged by tax incentives. 
We considered, but rejected, implementing PRAs by requiring employ- 
ers to deposit withheld funds directly into their employees’ investment 
accounts. Such an approach would substantially increase the burdens on 
employers, particularly small employers. Not only would they be respon- 
sible for monthly reporting and funding, but they would also be respon- 
sible for providing information,  selecting among funds, and correcting 
errors. We  do not believe that those additional burdens would produce 
adequate additional value. 
Currently, 401(k) plans are offered to only 7 percent of workers in firms 
with fewer than twenty-five employees. Workers earning less than $1  5,000 
a year account for just  8.3 percent  of  workers who participate  in  any 
40l(k)-type retirement plan and only  16 percent  of participants in any 
type of employer-based defined-contribution retirement plan (Olsen and 
Salisbury 1998). In contrast, the 62 million workers with $15,000 or less 
of  wages will  constitute 46  percent  of participants in PRAs. For those 
workers, the lag between the time when they earn wages and the funding 
of their PRAs will cost at most about $20 a year (the income lost from a 
10. We recognize that there is still some lag in funding (whether measured from the time 
taxes are withheld or from the end of  the year). Nonetheless, on an account-by-account 
basis, there is no feasible or practical alternative to the approach that we  recommend. Two 
other approaches have been suggested to minimize the effect of this lag: credit all accounts 
with some kind of imputed earnings (e.g., the short-term Treasury rate, using a six-month 
convention) or have the government invest funds on an aggregate basis during the year in 
SPIFs, using estimated investment choices. The former would be workable (the contribution 
to each account would be “grossed up” by  the same percentage). The latter would likely 
impose substantial additional administrative burdens. A Practical and Workable System of Personal Retirement Accounts  19 
twelve-month delay at a 7 percent  return following year-end is at most 
$20, or less than $2,100 over a lifetime).” To  compensate for this loss of 
income, the government might credit individual PRAs with the return on 
Treasury borrowing for the period between earning the wages and funding 
the  PRA.  Alternatively,  the  government  could  remit  an  appropriate 
amount of aggregate PRA funds to a default SPIF with the income subse- 
quently paid out to individual PRAs on the basis of wage reports. We 
regard the first alternative, which is simpler, as adequate, but either of 
these options is preferable to requiring employers to deposit funds directly 
into their employees’ PRAs. 
Workers Not Required to File; Error Correction; Workers Who 
Do Not Make an Investment Election; Noncompliance 
It is  also necessary to provide for workers who choose not to file tax 
returns because their incomes are below the applicable filing thresholds.l* 
The easiest way to address this issue is to permit these workers to file their 
social security PRA investment election form, along with copies of their 
W-2s, with an IRS service center.I3 
At present, the IRS and the SSA are able to “perfect” the information 
regarding  each  worker’s  covered wages  within  approximately eighteen 
months after the end of the calendar year. While the information on most 
workers’ covered wages is accurate (and most of it is now filed electroni- 
cally), there are a  significant number  of errors that must be  corrected 
each year. 
While the error numbers are large in absolute terms, they are small as 
a percentage of the entire program (see n. 9 above). Moreover, because a 
system of PRAs would place a greater premium on timely and accurate 
information, it is possible that there would be fewer errors over time. What 
is important to note is that these errors occur-and  have to be corrected- 
under current law. As a result, under the implementation scheme described 
above, no new information processing is  required. The only additional 
step is that some adjustment in the funded accounts will be required (sub- 
ject to de minimis tolerances). Because the PRAs that must be adjusted 
will virtually always exist, any over- or underfunding can be remedied with 
11. Olsen and Salisbury (1998) show that, after forty years, a once-per-year deposit of 
$1,200 would yield $8,315 less than a once-per-month  deposit of $100 at a 7 percent rate 
($254,166 rather than $262,481). For a $300 annual deposit, the lifetime loss would be only 
about $2,080. 
12. While several million individuals file returns each year showing income below the ap- 
plicable filing thresholds and almost 1 million individuals file returns each year showing no 
adjusted  gross income, several million individuals do not file returns at all because their 
income falls below the applicable filing thresholds. 
13. While the SSA does not process W-2s below a certain threshold, this procedure would 
enable all workers to get PRA credit for their earnings. 20  Fred T.  Goldberg Jr. and Michael J. Graetz 
relative ease.14 With respect to both over- and underfunding situations, it 
would be necessary to provide rules regarding actual or imputed earnings 
(or loss) prior to the correction date. Thus, for example, where accounts 
are overfunded, the withdrawal could reflect actual gains or losses, and, 
where accounts are underfunded, earnings could be credited at a specified 
rate, for example, the Treasury rate applicable to the correction period.15 
For any worker who does not designate an investment option, his or her 
PRA would be invested in the manner specified by  statute. In the case of 
workers filing tax returns, the IRS would gather the necessary information 
(e.g., covered wages) from the 1040 form. In the case of workers not filing 
tax returns, the information would be  gathered from W-2 forms filed by 
employers. Because there could be a substantial lag in this latter context, it 
raises the issue of whether these accounts should be credited with imputed 
earnings (see nn. 4,  10, and 11 above). 
A more difficult issue arises where no information returns are filed with 
respect to a worker, there is no withholding with respect to that worker’s 
earnings, and the worker fails to file income-tax returns. Under these cir- 
cumstances, crediting any amount to the worker’s PRA will be virtually 
impossible without direct contact with the worker and/or the worker’s em- 
ployer. These cases will  be quite rare and serve to show only that no law 
is  100 percent enforceable. 
1.3.3  Investment Options 
appropriate. 
SSA-Sponsored Options 
Workers could elect to invest their PRAs in a limited number of funds 
sponsored by  the SSA, with the management and administration of the 
funds contracted out to the private sector (SPIFs). From an investment 
and management  standpoint, the  SSA-sponsored funds would  operate 
similarly to the federal employees’ Thrift Savings Plan (TSP).16  This alter- 
As noted above, a two-tiered system of investment options seems most 
14. As a practical matter, this would avoid many of the compliance problems encountered 
in other contexts (e.g., the earned income-tax credit). 
15. Presumably, the SSA (rather than the IRS) should have responsibility for these error- 
correction activities, and the costs of this activity should be funded from general revenues. 
16. The TSP, which is a retirement savings and investment plan for federal employees that 
was established by Congress in the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986, is a 
defined-contribution plan that provides federal employees with a choice of three investment 
options. First, employees can allocate all or a portion of their accounts to the “G Fund,” 
which consists exclusively of investments in short-term nonmarketable U.S.  Treasury securi- 
ties issued directly to the TSP by the US. Treasury. Second, employees can allocate all or a 
portion of their accounts to the “C Fund,” which is invested in a Standard and Poor’s 500 
stock index fund. Third, employees can allocate all or a portion of their accounts to the “F 
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native would be administered on a no-frills basis. Obviously, there is  a 
trade-off between offering a variety of choices and keeping costs low.  For 
example, SPIF investments could be limited to so-called lifestyle funds- 
a mix of debt and equity index fund investments with the proportion of 
equity adjusted to provide a level of risk appropriate to the participant’s 
age. Alternatively, participants’ investment options could be limited to the 
following: (1) one or two equity index funds, for example, one based on 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 and one based on the Russell 2000 or Wilshire 
5000,’7  and (2) one or two bond funds, one limited to U.S. Treasuries and 
the other based on corporate debt. (Two default funds might be provided 
for people who fail to elect any investment option. The first-a  60 percent 
equity, 40 percent debt fund-would  apply to all individuals under age 
fifty-five. The  second-an  80  percent  debt, 20  percent  equity  fund- 
would apply to all individuals age fifty-five or over.) Participants would 
receive their account statements once (or perhaps twice) each year (addi- 
tional statements could be made available for a fee). Automated account 
information would be available at any time. Participants could reallocate 
funds twice (or perhaps four times) a year without any additional charge 
(additional changes could be permitted for a fee). 
This configuration represents a reasonable balance among competing 
objectives: it keeps administrative costs low while providing reasonable in- 
vestment choices and market-comparable services to the millions of work- 
ers likely to participate in the SPIFs. It would, of course, be possible to 
increase or decrease investment options and services in ways that would 
increase or decrease costs of administering the program. Given the large 
number of relatively small SPIF accounts, however, keeping costs low is 
important so that investment returns will not be eroded. 
After a phase-in period (which we  estimate to be up to five years), the 
annual costs of administering SPIFs in the configuration described above 
are expected to be in the range of thirty to fifty basis points.18 By  way  of 
comparison, appendix B provides more detailed information regarding cur- 
rent costs of a variety of investment funds. 
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, which is responsible for the oversight and man- 
agement of the TSP, contracts with Barclays Global Investors to manage and invest the 
amounts allocated to the C and F Funds by participants in the TSP. The TSP also plans to 
add two additional investment options (a Russell 2000 index and a foreign stock index) in 
the near future. 
17. By law, the TSP may make equity investments only in a “commonly recognized index” 
that is a “reasonably complete representation of United States equity markets.” 
18. Although we  have seen cost estimates ranging from five to more than one hundred 
basis points, this is similar to the range of costs estimated in National Academy of Social 
Insurance (1998). It is also similar to the range of costs estimated by  representatives from 
State Street Bank and Fidelity at a conference on the feasibility of PRAs (“Beyond Ideol- 
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Regardless of the specific configuration of investment options and ac- 
count services, the SPIF approach raises a number of policy and adminis- 
trative issues. Some examples follow: 
What portion of the administrative costs should be financed from direct 
charges to accounts? How should such amounts be allocated? Allocating 
such amounts on the basis of the amount of  assets in accounts, rather 
than on a fixed-dollar-per-account basis, seems most consistent with the 
goal of  broadening capital market participation  by  low- and moderate- 
income workers. 
What portion, if  any,  of  the administrative costs should be financed 
from general revenues? In considering this question, two points are worth 
noting: (1) To  deal with transition costs, it may be useful to cap admin- 
istrative costs charged to PRAs at some level  (e.g., thirty to fifty basis 
points) and fund any excess from general revenues. (2) It has been sug- 
gested that some or all administrative costs should be funded from general 
revenues on one or more of the following grounds: it would increase the 
net return on PRAs; from a “fairness” standpoint, it would be progressive; 
PRAs are a “public good” (everyone benefits from increased savings and 
the creation of wealth for all workers); general revenues cover the admin- 
istrative costs of similar government functions (e.g., medicare, social se- 
curity, and the IRS). On the other hand, fully funding administrative ex- 
penses from general revenues may  remove any incentive for individual 
investors to see that such costs are minimized. 
By  requiring  that  the  SPIF investments be  contracted  out, we  have 
sought to minimize the risks that the government will use these funds to 
interfere in the capital markets (e.g., by  rewarding or punishing certain 
industries or companies, by competing with the private sector, or by mak- 
ing investment decisions to address fiscal, social, or foreign policy issues). 
We have illustrated rules governing the choice of SPIF funds for workers 
who do not elect any investment option, but there are obviously other al- 
ternatives. Presumably, as we have noted, funds would be allocated on the 
basis of an age-adjusted formula. Should the default formulas be specified 
in legislation or left to the discretion of one or more regulatory bodies? 
Should anything be done to address concerns over stock market volatil- 
ity,  especially as workers approach retirement age? For example, in the 
context of the SPIF, should there be rules mandating more conservative 
investment allocations as workers approach retirement age? Should the 
SPIF offer some kind of “risk insurance” or investment guarantee? 
What kind of information should be provided to workers regarding their 
investment options, who should provide that information, and how should 
the costs of providing that information be allocated? Consistent with our 
basic goal of minimizing burdens on employers, especially small employ- 
ers, placing responsibility for education with the SSA seems an appro- 
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seems likely that other avenues of education, including by nonprofit organ- 
izations, will emerge. 
As a practical matter, answers to some of these questions may vary de- 
pending on whether the accounts are funded through a carve-out, through 
an add-on mechanism, or from general revenues. We  want to emphasize 
that the implementation system outlined here can accommodate a wide 
range of answers to these and other policy issues. 
Private Fund Options 
In addition to SSA-sponsored SPIFs, the PRA program could permit 
individuals to invest their funds with one or more privately sponsored 
qualified private funds (Q-funds). There are several reasons for making 
such an option available to workers: It allows individual workers to avail 
themselves of  the wide range of investment alternatives and investment 
services offered by  the private ~ector.’~  Because workers can take advan- 
tage of private-sector options, it will be easier to maintain the SPIF as a 
low cost, easy-to-understand, limited-choice alternative. It will reduce the 
risk that the federal government will  “compete” with the private sector 
through manipulating the SPIF. Finally, it will reduce the risk that politi- 
cians and interest groups will seek to use the SPIF to pursue unrelated 
political, social, economic, or foreign policy objectives. 
As we  have said, the financial institution offering Q-funds, and the Q- 
funds themselves, will  need to be regulated regarding permitted  invest- 
ments, financial solvency, and disclosure requirements. We expect existing 
regulatory mechanisms to be adequate for this purpose.2o  For example: As 
with  qualified retirement  plans  and  IRAs under  current  law,  Q-funds 
should be segregated from other investment funds (i.e.,  there should be 
no commingling of assets). The diversification requirements applicable to 
mutual funds (regulated investment companies) and the fiduciary obliga- 
tions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pro- 
vide  a starting point  for addressing various risk-related issues; Q-fund 
sponsors could be required to offer a minimum range of investments (e.g., 
index equity funds and short- and long-term bond alternatives).2’  While 
any Q-fund sponsors could offer a wide range of investment alternatives, 
limiting individuals to one PRA account may be appropriate to avoid the 
excessive administrative costs that multiple accounts would entail; this 
would mean that an individual’s account would be invested through either 
an SPIF or the Q-funds of a single financial institution. The system could 
build  on current reporting  requirements to assure that the government 
19. For the reasons noted above (e.g., the wire-transfer of almost 20 million refunds), this 
20. We  also think that it is preferable to rely  on that structure to the maximum extent 
21. These alternatives are currently required by sec. 404(c) of ERISA. 
alternative could be implemented at little incremental cost to the federal government. 
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receives the information necessary to monitor the Q-funds and the status 
of individual workers’ accounts.22 
There are two ways in which to determine which institutions would be 
permitted to offer Q-funds and the conditions under which those Q-funds 
could be offered. One approach would be to impose a uniform set of li- 
censing criteria that would be centrally administered by a single regulatory 
agency. Alternatively, those same criteria could be administered separately 
by the agency now responsible for regulating the sponsoring financial in- 
stitution. In either event, because the federal government, rather than indi- 
vidual workers, would  provide original transfers  of  funds to Q-funds, 
workers would be protected from fraud by unauthorized promoters. As for 
the licensing requirements themselves, one approach would be to integrate 
them with existing regulatory standards regarding permitted investments, 
safety and soundness, and disclosure. In this context, the legislation could 
impose additional requirements that were deemed appropriate (e.g., bond- 
ing or insurance requirements, net-worth requirements, etc.). 
From the standpoint of ongoing compliance, financial institutions and 
Q-funds could be monitored by existing regulatory authorities as part of 
their overall responsibilities (e.g., the Department of Treasury and Labor, 
the Federal Reserve Board, and the SEC; table lC.l in  app. C summa- 
rizes the current regulatory structure of financial institutions likely to offer 
Q-funds). This structure would also permit rules limiting and allocating 
the administrative costs of Q-funds. We  believe that, in the light of the 
SPIF alternative, these rules could be limited and should focus on disclo- 
sure requirements. Nonetheless, in the light of concerns about the poten- 
tial for marketing costs to increase administrative costs and reduce invest- 
ment returns, financial institutions offering Q-funds might be limited in 
allocating marketing costs to Q-funds or offering “bonuses” for individu- 
als to shift funds to a different offeror. In addition, as with SPIFs, Q-fund 
sponsors could be required to allocate all costs within each fund on an 
asset rather than a fixed-dollar-per-account basis. 
Some commentators  have expressed the concern that Q-funds might 
attract a disproportionate share of PRAs with relatively high dollar ac- 
count balances, increasing the per account cost of  SPIFs. One response 
might be to levy an asset-based charge on Q-funds andlor their sponsors 
to defray the cost of administering SPIFs. Likewise, to limit skimming of 
large accounts by  Q-funds, it may be appropriate to require Q-funds to 
accept PRAs above some asset value. 
Once again, we  want to emphasize that this administrative structure 
22. This latter requirement would be particularly important if PRAs are funded from gen- 
eral revenues and those accounts are integrated in some manner with social security to ad- 
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provides Congress substantial flexibility in addressing numerous policy is- 
sues (e.g., bonding, insurance, and/or net-worth requirements applicable to 
the Q-fund and the sponsoring institution; limitations, if any, on permitted 
investments; age-based portfolio  requirements; rules governing spousal 
rights; the protection of workers’ assets from creditors’ claims; and disclo- 
sure requirements). Thus, while we  believe that it is possible to keep any 
such regulation to a minimum and that, to the extent possible, such regula- 
tion should be integrated with existing rules, the legislation authorizing Q- 
funds could impose whatever regulatory requirements Congress deems ap- 
propriate. 
On the basis of industry experience with 401(k) and IRA accounts, Q- 
fund  accounts  should  cost  about  $15-$25  annually, depending  on the 
amount and kind of service provided (e.g., frequency of statements, fre- 
quency of free telephone inquiries, etc.). In the system that we  describe 
here, such costs would be allocated on the basis of assets, not on a per 
account basis. We  have suggested that each individual have only one ac- 
count, but, if  people are permitted to elect to have multiple Q-fund ac- 
counts with different financial institutions, they should bear the costs of 
such choices. 
SPIFs and Q-Funds Together 
Most of the commentators who have considered PRAs have proposed 
that all investments be made either through a simple investment vehicle 
(resembling our SPIF) or through privately run accounts (resembling our 
Q-fund). This naturally raises the question why both the SPIF and the Q- 
fund options are desirable. In our judgment, the SPIF and Q-fund invest- 
ment choices work together in important ways. Standing alone, each has 
the potential for problems that will be policed by the other if both options 
are made available. For example, the existence of the Q-fund alternative 
makes it more likely that the SPIF can be preserved as a simple, low-cost 
system with a limited selection of investment alternatives. It also reduces 
the risk-which  a government-contracted fund standing alone entails- 
that the SPIF will be used for political, social, or foreign policy purposes. 
At the same time, having the SPIF in place will keep pressure on Q-fund 
sponsors to minimize costs and marketing abuses of the sort that have 
plagued some PRA systems abroad while allowing Americans great inde- 
pendence and flexibility in their investment  Likewise, having the 
SPIF in place will  reduce pressure to impose detailed regulations on Q- 
funds (e.g., a requirement that all Q-fund sponsors offer SPIF-type funds; 
restrictions on fees). The balance provided by SPIFs and Q-funds together 
23. For example, the SPIF alternative may be the most effective deterrent to the marketing- 
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makes the approach that we  are suggesting preferable to a PRA system 
limited to either alternative standing alone. 
Education and Error Correction 
As we  have suggested, giving the federal government primary respon- 
sibility for educating workers regarding all aspects of the PRA program, 
including basic information  regarding eligible Q-funds, accomplishes a 
number of objectives. Most notably, it minimizes the burden on employers 
and helps assure uniformity and quality control. One approach would be 
to give primary responsibility to the SSA. The SSA would work with other 
federal agencies (e.g., the Departments of the Treasury and of Labor, the 
SEC, and the Federal Reserve) and have substantial latitude to contract 
out various activities to the private sector. Funding these efforts with gen- 
eral revenues seems appropriate. The nature of the program also makes it 
likely that a great deal of education would be provided at no cost to the 
program or the federal government and that a number of private nonprofit 
organizations will participate  in educating the public (e.g., popular and 
specialized media; educational institutions; employers [on a volunteer ba- 
sis]; sponsors of Q-funds). 
As  noted,  there is a high level  of  accuracy associated with  wage re- 
porting and the issuance of tax refunds under current law. Nonetheless, in 
absolute terms, there are certain to be a sizable number of errors in the 
crediting of accounts and a significant number of inquiries regarding SPIF 
account-related  One approach would be to give the SSA pri- 
mary responsibility for handling  these questions and resolving any ac- 
count discrepancies. The SSA would work with other federal agencies (pri- 
marily,  the IRS) and have substantial latitude  to contract  out various 
activities to the private sector. While both the IRS and the SSA have sub- 
stantial call-site operations, the SSA may be better equipped to handle the 
likely range of inquiries (perhaps subcontracting with the IRS to handle 
certain calls). This approach also avoids concerns over the appearance of 
telling participants that they must resolve account issues with the IRS. 
1.3.4  Distributions from PRAs 
Policy Issues 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the rules governing 
distributions from PRAs pose difficult policy issues. For example, to what 
extent, if any, should beneficiaries be required to annuitize their PRAs on 
retirement? Among the options are that all PRA funds must be annuitized, 
that there be no mandatory annuitization requirements, that PRA funds 
must be annuitized to the extent necessary to provide some minimum in- 
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come level (when combined with other social security benefits), and that 
there be limited annuitization alternatives (e.g., for funding of joint-and- 
survivor long-term-care coverage). 
If some type of annuitization is required, what form must those annu- 
ities take? Among the options are that annuities should provide benefits 
parallel to existing social security benefits (e.g., inflation adjusted; joint- 
and-survivor annuities, with reduced payments to the survivor); that bene- 
fits should parallel the qualified plan/IRA rules (account balance divided 
by life expectancy); and that there be a limited number of acceptable annu- 
ity alternatives (e.g., the ability to include other beneficiaries under joint- 
and-survivor annuities; no reduction in payments to survivor; varied pay- 
ment streams; term certain, on early retirement). 
When can workers first gain access to their PRAs? Among the options 
are the following: at the normal social security retirement age (or when 
they qualify for social security disability payments); whenever they first be- 
gin collecting social security benefits; at their election, any time after they 
first begin collecting social security benefits (i.e., permit continued accu- 
mulation); and before they begin collecting social security benefits if their 
PRA funds are sufficient to provide some minimum monthly payment 
(taking into account anticipated future social security benefits) (i.e., use 
PRAs to facilitate early retirement). 
What will happen to PRA contributions on behalf of the several million 
individuals who continue working, and continue paying payroll taxes, af- 
ter they begin collecting social security? If the worker continues to main- 
tain a PRA, then his or her contributions would simply continue. If, how- 
ever, the entire balance of the worker’s PRA has already gone to purchase 
some form of annuity, his or her withholding could be  reduced by  an 
amount that would otherwise go to fund the worker’s PRA (e.g., if PRAs 
are funded by an add-on or a carve-out), funding could stop for the work- 
er’s PRA (if PRAs are funded from general revenues), or the worker could 
be given a refundable tax credit equal to the amount added to his or her 
PRA (if PRAs are funded by a carve-out or from general revenues). 
If PRAs are funded in whole or in part from general revenues andor 
integrated in some way with social security, how should that integration 
be  structured? Among the options are the mandatory annuitization  of 
PRAs, with a partial offset against payments otherwise due under social 
security, or the lump-sum transfer of a specified portion of PRA balances 
to social security on the death, disability, or retirement of the worker. 
To  some degree, the answers to these questions will  depend  on how 
PRAs are funded. As before, however, the goals of implementing any of 
these policy decisions will be to promote fairness, to keep administrative 
costs to a minimum, and to devise a system that the American people can 
easily understand. We discuss the options below. 28  Fred T. Goldberg Jr. and Michael J. Graetz 
SSA-Sponsored Annuity Option 
Under this alternative, a worker’s  PRA funds would be transferred to 
social security when the worker first begins receiving social security bene- 
fits. The amount of the worker’s  and survivor’s social security benefits 
would be increased on the basis of the value of the worker’s PRA. In other 
words, the government would decide what amount of annuity to pay for 
a given PRA accumulation. The primary virtue of this alternative is its 
simplicity. From the worker’s perspective, it requires no choices or deci- 
sions. The worker will  receive only one monthly payment and will  deal 
with only one party making payments (the SSA). From the government’s 
perspective, the only additional administrative costs occur at the outset: 
collecting the PRA funds and making the appropriate adjustment to social 
security payments. 
Social security could implement this alternative by contracting out all 
aspects of the program (other than processing beneficiary payments) to 
the private sector, with the private sector setting the annuity amount (with 
indexing for inflation) and thereby bearing investment and mortality risks. 
We  believe that contracting out is a better alternative than social security 
directly administering PRA-funded annuities. For example, what return 
would the government assume on the funds that it received from the work- 
er’s PRA-and  would the government be permitted to invest those funds 
in the same way that private insurers invest premiums? Given the relatively 
long period of retirement that workers can now be expected to enjoy, de- 
priving them of equity market returns during this entire period seems in- 
consistent with one key  purpose of enacting PRAs in the first place: ex- 
panding low- and moderate-income workers’ access to capital markets. 
Who would bear the risks if the government underprices its annuity (tax- 
payers or beneficiaries?), and what mechanism would be used to imple- 
ment the allocation of risks? What effect, if  any, would this role for the 
government have on the private annuities market? 
Contracting out to the private sector under rules that protect against 
companies segmenting longevity risks permits the market to resolve the 
pricing issues and avoids any potential adverse effect of a government-run 
system on the private annuities market. The government’s role would be 
limited to setting appropriate annuity specifications, processing payments, 
and regulating and supervising the private-sector financial institutions re- 
sponsible for the program. 
In this regard, it is important to note that a market structure is already 
in  place  to  implement  this  system. Thus,  for  example,  most  defined- 
contribution plans offer annuity options that are provided by  insurance 
carriers (rather than the plan itself).25 
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Private Market Annuity Options 
Workers and their beneficiaries could also be permitted to purchase pri- 
vate annuity options so long as problems of  adverse selection and risk 
segmentation are addressed. Permitting individual workers and their ben- 
eficiaries to avail themselves of  the wider range of  annuity alternatives 
available from the private sector offers several advantages. For example, a 
family may prefer a joint-and-survivor annuity with a pattern of payments 
that differs from the SSA-sponsored model, a family may prefer annuity 
payments that cover a disabled child or elderly parents, or a worker may 
want to retire early with a “retirement-gap’’ annuity that runs for a term 
of years, until social security benefits begin. By  allowing workers to take 
advantage of  private-sector options, it will  be possible to maintain  an 
SSA-sponsored annuity option as a simple, low-cost, easy-to-understand 
alternative. 
It would be necessary to regulate the institutions offering private market 
annuities in exchange for PRA balances with regard to segmentation of 
longevity risks, safety and soundness, and disclosure.26  Because insurance 
has been regulated historically at the state level, there is no existing federal 
regime  to regulate annuities.  For  this  reason,  a  threshold  decision  is 
whether to rely on the existing state-based structure, create a new federal 
structure, or create a hybrid system of  federal standards for qualifying 
annuities, enforced by the states. 
It is also important that administrative costs of private annuities be kept 
to a minimum and allocated fairly. As with the PRAs themselves, we  be- 
lieve that this means that the costs of the SSA-sponsored annuities should 
be allocated on the basis of asset size rather than on a per account basis. 
Because the administrative costs of individual annuities may be as much 
as 5-10  percent of the purchase price (even without premiums for adverse 
selection), we believe that it is appropriate for retirees who choose to pur- 
chase such annuities to bear these costs themselves. 
1.4  Conclusion 
Two conclusions emerge from the foregoing. First, any system of PRAs 
will have to resolve many difficult policy questions. The most fundamental 
are, Should federal retirement policy move in the direction of universal 
PRAs? How should personal retirement accounts be funded (as a carve- 
out from payroll taxes, from mandatory additional contributions, or from 
general revenues)? What rules should govern distributions from PRAs? 
26. Likewise, as noted above, policy considerations may place constraints on the types of 
annuities that can be offered. It may be appropriate to impose some kind of minimum guar- 
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Second, regardless of how these policy questions are answered, institu- 
tions  and mechanisms already exist that make it feasible to introduce 
PRAs in a way that minimizes administrative costs, distributes those costs 
fairly and reasonably, imposes little or no incremental burden on employ- 
ers, is easy to explain and easy to understand, and meets the expectations 
of everyday Americans for simplicity, security, independence, and control. 
We  believe that the system that we  have outlined above meets these 
criteria. There are no doubt other ways in which a system of PRAs might 
be implemented. However, most of the alternatives suggested to date im- 
pose greater burdens on employers than does the system that we  have 
outlined here because they give employers responsibility for transferring 
their employees’ funds directly into investment funds and require employ- 
ers to provide information about investment choices to their employees. 
These are burdens that we have endeavored to avoid. There are also many 
possible variations on the themes that we have outlined here. For example, 
some  have  suggested  that-rather  than  permitting  direct  transfers  of 
funds into Q-funds, as we have suggested here-all  funds should move di- 
rectly into SPIFs, with rollovers permitted only after some period of time 
or after the individual’s PRA balance has reached some threshold amount. 
We  do not view such a limitation as necessary, but, to be sure, this is the 
kind of issue over which reasonable people may differ. 
The plan for implementing PRAs that we  have offered here will work 
no matter how various policy questions are decided. It will work however 
PRAs are financed, whether from existing payroll taxes, from general reve- 
nues, or through new mandated savings; whether PRAs are mandatory or 
voluntary; whether PRAs are integrated with social security benefits or 
not; whatever the regime of spousal rights; and whether or not distribu- 
tions are required to be annuitized. And it will work at reasonable admin- 
istrative costs with those costs allocated fairly among beneficiaries. 
Building on existing public and private systems and existing regulatory 
structures-as  the approach that we have described here does-minimizes 
start-up costs and makes it more likely that the program can be imple- 
mented relatively quickly and smoothly. This approach also takes advan- 
tage of the fact that administrative, market, and regulatory systems are 
dynamic; they tend to change in response to changed incentives. The sys- 
tem that we  have described creates incentives that are likely to improve 
current practices in a variety of areas. For example, all the affected partici- 
pants (workers, employers, the IRS, the FMS, and the SSA) will be moti- 
vated to improve the timeliness and accuracy of W-2 reporting and the 
filing and processing of income-tax returns. In turn, these improvements 
will benefit workers, employers, and the government in ways that go well 
beyond  PRAs.  Other  areas where  improvements are likely include in- 
creased financial literacy among workers and beneficiaries, growth and 
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cation  of  the  regime for regulating financial intermediaries. Moreover, 
while the PRA program would encourage additional investment in tech- 
nology and improving a variety of administrative operations, those addi- 
tional investments are not a prerequisite for the effective implementation 
of PRAs. 
Our key point is simply this: if PRAs are wise public policy, they can be 
implemented at a reasonable cost in a manner that imposes relatively little 
stress on existing public and private institutions. 
To put the administrative challenge of PRAs in context, it is worth re- 
calling what the world was like when social security itself was introduced 
in  1935. There were no social security numbers. Many Americans did not 
have a telephone. There were no computers-all  records were maintained 
on paper; all information was entered by  hand; all correspondence was 
sent and delivered by  mail; there was no computer-based financial infra- 
structure. Implementing social security under these conditions was hard; 
by comparison, implementing PRAs today would be easy. While there are 
difficult administrative issues regarding PRAs, they are not insurmount- 
able. Administrative concerns should not become an excuse for not imple- 
menting PRAs-the  only question is whether PRAs are good policy. 
Appendix A 
Background on PRAs in Foreign Countries 
Australia 
The Australian retirement-income system is a two-pillar model. The first 
pillar provides a flat-rate, means-tested pension known as the age pension. 
The second pillar is the private retirement provision and mandates com- 
pulsory concessionally taxed saving for retirement through an employ- 
ment-based system known as the superannuation guarantee (SG). The SG 
is a compulsory, occupation-based, defined-contribution superannuation 
system. Under the SG, employers are required to make on behalf of their 
employees prescribed minimum contributions to complying superannua- 
tion funds, or PRAs. By 2002, this minimum contribution will be 9 percent 
of employee earnings. Employees also contribute 3 percent of their earn- 
ings to the superannuation funds, and the government can make contribu- 
tions of as much as 3 percent of pay for lower-paid employees. 
Unlike the Chilean or the Latin American model, the key feature of the 
Australian model is the fact that, rather than having individual accounts 
with individual choice, the employer and/or union trustees choose the in- 
vestment manager for the company or the occupation group as a whole. 
Superannuation funds are managed by  professionals in the financial ser- 32  Fred T.  Goldberg Jr. and Michael J. Graetz 
vice industry. The superannuation system has only one fund per employer, 
but workers still have a choice of investment because each fund offers 
several investment options. Superannuation funds operate as trusts, with 
the trustees being solely responsible for the prudential operation of their 
funds  and  for  formulating  and  implementing  an  investment  strategy. 
Superannuation funds face few investment restrictions; there are no asset 
requirements or floors, no minimum rate-of-return requirements, and no 
government guarantee of benefits. The prudential regulation of the super- 
annuation  system is  currently  the  responsibility of  the  Insurance  and 
Superannuation Commission. 
Chile 
Chile replaced social insurance with individual funded pensions in the 
early 1980s. Under Chile’s pension savings account (PSA) system, neither 
the worker nor the employer pays a social security tax to the state. Nor 
does the worker collect a government-funded pension. Instead, during his 
working life, he automatically has 10 percent of his wages deposited by 
his employer each month in his own, individual PSA. This percentage ap- 
plies only to the first $22,000 of annual income. A worker may also volun- 
tarily make additional tax-deductible contributions  of up to  10 percent 
of wages. 
A worker chooses one of the twenty-one private pension fund admin- 
istration companies (udministrudoras de fondos de pensiones, or AFPs) to 
manage his PSA. The companies were specifically created for this purpose 
and are not  allowed to engage in other business or financial activities. 
They are also subject to government regulation intended to guarantee a 
diversified and low-risk portfolio and to prevent theft or fraud. A separate 
government entity, a highly  technical “AFP Superintendency,” provides 
oversight of these companies. 
Each AFP operates the equivalent of  a mutual  fund that invests in 
stocks and bonds. Investment decisions are made by  the AFP. Govern- 
ment regulation sets only maximum percentage limits both for specific 
types of instruments and for the overall mix of the portfolio, and the spirit 
of the reform is that those regulations should be reduced constantly with 
the passage of time and as the AFP companies gain experience. The AFPs 
are under no obligation to invest in government or any other type of bond. 
Legally, the AFP company and the mutual fund that it administers are 
two separate entities. Thus, should an AFP go under, the assets of the mu- 
tual fund-that  is, the workers’ investments-should  not be affected. 
Workers are free to change from one AFP company to another on short 
notice. Each worker is given a PSA passbook and every three months re- 
ceives a regular statement informing him how much money has been accu- 
mulated in his retirement account and how well his investment fund has 
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The Chilean PSA system includes both private- and public-sector em- 
ployees. All employed workers, with the exception of members of the po- 
lice and armed forces, must have a PSA. Self-employed workers may enter 
the system at their option. 
A worker who has contributed for at least twenty years but whose pen- 
sion fund, on his reaching retirement age, is below the legally defined mini- 
mum pension receives benefits from the state once his PSA has been de- 
pleted. The PSA system also includes insurance against premature death 
and disability. Each AFP provides this service to its clients by purchasing 
group life and disability coverage from private life insurance companies. 
Sweden 
Sweden’s social security system, known as a “notional account” system, 
is a pay-as-you-go, defined-contribution system. Workers have individual 
accounts and passbooks that show accumulations and interest on accumu- 
lations, but, in reality, there is no money in the accounts; it is notional. 
The defined-contribution scheme has a rate of 18.5 percent shared equally 
between employees and employers. 
A small funded component to the system allows employees to allocate 
2.5 percent of their pension contributions to either a new pension fund, a 
new state-owned investment company, or an approved private investment 
fund. Collection and record keeping for the funded component will  be 
centralized, and workers will choose the investment manager from a list 
of mutual funds. A guaranteed pension acts as a safety net at the bottom 
of the income scale. 
United Kingdom 
The U.K. model is similar to the Australian model. It is a two-tiered 
pension system that is funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. The first compo- 
nent of the system is a flat-rate pension whereby both employees and em- 
ployers contribute  a fraction of the employees’ earnings to the system. 
Employees receive the full flat-rate benefit under the first tier of the system 
if  they  contribute to the system for the required  number  of qualifying 
years. The second tier of the system is the supplemental earnings-related 
pension  scheme  (SERPS), which  provides  benefits on a  supplemental 
basis. 
In the 198Os, employees were given the option of contracting out of the 
SERPS and taking a cut in their payroll tax of approximately 4.6 percent 
of their earnings and investing it in a private retirement account. In gen- 
eral, in order to opt out, employees must receive a private, earnings-related 
pension at least as high as the pension that they would have received had 
they fully participated in SERPS. Those who exercise the personal pension 
account option forgo their SERPS benefits. Britain allows only qualified 










counts. At present, at least seventeen hundred mutual funds and invest- 
ment funds can accept deposits. The system also places restrictions on the 
riskiness of investments, limiting the funds from investing more than 15 
percent of their assets in commodities, futures, or options. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from Lipper Analytical Services (1997). 
Note: GNMA = Government Natural Mortgage Association. 
Appendix C 
Regulation of Financial Institutions 
The banking, securities, and insurance companies that could offer Q-funds 
presently are subject to extensive regulation and oversight by federal and 
or state regulators as well  as self-regulatory organizations. The compari- 
son shown in table lC.l and the brief discussions that follow provide an 
overview of  the breadth  and depth  of  the  supervisory and  regulatory 
framework governing insurance, banking, and securities businesses. 
Banking 
All  depository  institutions  insured  by  the  FDIC,  including national 
banks, state-chartered banks, federally and state-chartered thrift institu- 
tions, and credit unions, are subject to comprehensive federal regulation, 
supervision, and examination by their appropriate regulators. The appro- A Practical and Workable System of Personal Retirement Accounts  35 
Table lC.l  Financial Institution Regulation 
Regulation  Banking  Insurance  Securities 
Capital adequacy  J  J  J 
Transactions with affiliates  J  J  J 
Safety and soundness  J  J  J 
Examination  J  J  J 
Record keeping  J  J  J 
Nondiscrimination and fair dealing  J  J  J 
priate regulators include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in 
the case of national banks; the FDIC and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal  Reserve System in  the case of  state nonmember  and member 
banks, respectively; the Office of Thrift Supervision for federal and state 
thrift institutions; the National Credit Union Administration for credit 
unions; and various state regulators in the case of state-chartered institu- 
tions. The operations and financial condition of these institutions are sub- 
ject to extensive regulation and supervision and to various requirements 
and restrictions under federal law, including requirements governing capi- 
tal adequacy (tier 1 and total risk-based capital requirements as well as a 
“leverage” capital requirement based on the ratio of tier 1 capital to total 
assets), activities and investments, bank transactions with affiliates, divi- 
dends, management practices, record keeping, and “year 2000” compli- 
ance. Insured depository institutions file annual, quarterly, monthly, and 
other reports with their regulators, which also perform on-site examina- 
tions. Federal and state regulators have broad enforcement authority over 
insured depository institutions, including the power to impose substantial 
fines and other civil penalties. 
Securities 
Broker-Dealers and Investment-Management Companies 
These companies are regulated, supervised, and examined by the SEC, 
the  Commodities  Futures  Trading Commission, and/or  self-regulatory 
organizations, including the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD), a registered securities association, and various national securi- 
ties exchanges. In accordance  with  section  15(b) of  the  Securities Ex- 
change Act of 1934, broker-dealers are members of the NASD and of var- 
ious securities exchanges. Pursuant to delegated authority from the SEC, 
the NASD and the exchanges enforce the substantive Securities Exchange 
Act rules and provide compliance oversight of the broker-dealer’s activ- 
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Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds are regulated, supervised, and examined by  the SEC un- 
der the Investment Company Act of  1940, as amended, and other federal 
securities laws.  In addition, their major service providers are regulated, 
supervised, and examined by the SEC, the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission, and/or self-regulatory organizations such as the NASD and 
various national securities exchanges. The 1940 act regulates, among other 
things, the amount of financial leverage that mutual funds may use, port- 
folio liquidity, investor redemption rights,  record keeping, mutual  fund 
disclosure and advertising practices, fees, and transactions among a mu- 
tual fund and its affiliates. Mutual funds file reports with the SEC semi- 
annually and maintain continuously updated registrations for the sale of 
shares under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. The SEC has exten- 
sive enforcement authority over mutual funds and their major service pro- 
viders, including the power to impose substantial fines and other civil pen- 
alties, prohibiting  violators  from  continued  activities in  the  securities 
industry, and referral to the Justice Department for criminal proceedings. 
Insurance 
Insurance companies are regulated, supervised, and examined by  state 
insurance regulators. The primary regulator for a company is generally the 
state in which it is domiciled, although there is an element of extraterri- 
torial application of  investment and other insurance laws to companies 
not domiciled in a state. The National Association of Insurance Commis- 
sioners (NAIC) promulgates model laws and regulations that are generally 
followed by the state insurance departments. These include a formula and 
a model law to implement risk-based capital requirements for life insur- 
ance companies and property and casualty insurance companies that are 
used as early warning tools by the NAIC and state regulatory agencies to 
identify insurance companies that merit further regulatory action. Insur- 
ance companies are also subject to various state statutory and regulatory 
restrictions on the amount of  dividends or distributions  that  they can 
make to their stockholders as well  as an extensive legislative and regula- 
tory regime with respect to investment practices, strategies, and proce- 
dures. The state insurance regulatory system incorporates tools to audit 
each insurance company domiciled within that state to determine that the 
insurance company is observing regulations regarding solvency, risk-based 
capital requirements, and dividend and investment restrictions. In addi- 
tion, individual products are reviewed by state regulators as to both forms 
and rates, and market-conduct examinations are utilized by  state regula- 
tors  to  ensure  that  all  the  consumer-protection  regulations  governing 
products, prices, sales, advertising, agent licensing, claim handling, and A Practical and Workable System of Personal Retirement Accounts  37 
fraud detection are strictly observed by any insurance company selling life 
or property-casualty insurance products in the state. 
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Comment  Gloria M. Grandolini 
The experience of the countries that have moved to some version of per- 
sonal retirement accounts (PRAs) shows that, as noted by Fred Goldberg 
and Michael Graetz, during the design phase most of the effort is focused 
on  policies and politics. The mechanics and  administration  of the re- 
formed system are dealt with during the implementation phase. Often, this 
approach has led to delays in the implementation of or to extensive fine- 
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tuning of the initial design. Detailing as they do the mechanics of imple- 
menting and administering PRAs as part of social security reform in the 
United States, Goldberg and Graetz provide an important contribution to 
the debate. 
The authors focus on three fundamental administrative functions: col- 
lecting and crediting funds to individual accounts; investing funds on be- 
half of individual participants; and distributing funds. As noted by the au- 
thors, the most important feature of the proposed scheme is size-a  very 
large number of accounts, the majority of them with very small amounts. 
These characteristics are shared by the PRA systems implemented in sev- 
eral Latin American countries. Establishing the mechanisms for funding 
the PRAs and for distributing funds from the PRAs would appear to be 
a less daunting task in the United States than it has been in Latin America. 
In the funding phase, the United States already has in place a system for 
wage reporting as well as payroll-tax and income-tax systems. For the dis- 
tribution phase, the United States has a developed private insurance in- 
dustry to provide the annuity alternatives. 
This  commentary  focuses  on the  investment-management  phase.  It 
summarizes the key  lessons learned and challenges ahead deriving from 
the practical experiences of those Latin American countries that have im- 
plemented a pension scheme based on privately managed individual ac- 
counts (see Grandolini and Cerda 1998; and “Latin American Pension 
Systems” 1998). 
Any PRA system must be practical and workable, but its ultimate objec- 
tive is to maximize returns. To achieve this objective, four general themes 
are highlighted by the Latin American experience. First is the critical im- 
portance of goodgovernance to establish the proper balance of accountabil- 
ities and ensure the most appropriate overall investment strategy. The im- 
portance of educating the members of the oversight committee, given their 
key  role in setting investment policy, must also be emphasized. In fact, 
finance theory, historical data, and empirical studies stress the critical im- 
portance of the investment-policy-setting process, particularly the asset- 
allocation decision. Approximately 90 percent of investment performance 
appears to result from the asset-class decision and the policy weights as- 
signed to each eligible asset class. In U.S. plans, the trend is toward in- 
creasing allocation to riskier assets (i.e., equities) and toward more sophis- 
ticated choices for individual investors within 401(k)s. 
Second, on the  theory  and  practice  of  strategic asset  allocation and 
risk management, one critical-and  often  overlooked-fact  is  that  the 
investment-  and  funding-policy  process  for  defined-benefit  (DB)  and 
defined-contribution (DC) plans is  the same. DC plans also have a tar- 
get replacement rate-albeit  implicit and intermediate. This remains true 
even if the ownership of the liability is different-the  sponsor in DB plans 
and the individual in DC schemes. In terms of risk management, the focus A Practical and Workable System of Personal Retirement Accounts  39 
should be on the liability structure. The probability of not achieving the 
desired ratio of assets to liabilities is the most important risk  for both 
schemes. Hence, even within a DC environment-which  is the overall di- 
rection  of  the  Latin American  pension  reforms-the  risk  of  the  plan 
should not be analyzed only in terms of the volatility of asset returns. 
Third, in terms of performance management, two areas are key. The im- 
portance of  setting appropriate benchmarks for asset and risk manage- 
ment and the need to focus on after-fee returns and increase the use of 
decision-based performance-attribution analysis. Finally, regarding the op- 
timal degree of flexibility of investment guidelines, in the Latin American 
context there appears to be a consensus that, in the initial stages of a pen- 
sion reform shifting to private management of mandatory social security 
contributions, it is appropriate to implement limited portfolio choices- 
particularly in terms of exposure to equities and foreign securities. How- 
ever, there also seems to be agreement that these constraints should be 
relaxed and investment choices expanded as participants’ financial educa- 
tion increases. 
The  main  challenges in  the  investment-management area  currently 
faced by PRAs in the Latin American context include the following seven 
policy themes, several of which appear to be relevant for the design of a 
practical and workable system of PRAs in  the United States as well,  a 
system that can also deliver appropriate after-fee returns: strengthening 
of  the  governance structure  of  the  reformed  systems; bringing to  the 
forefront of the debate the most appropriate division of labor in setting 
the  strategic  asset  allocation  among  the  regulators,  the  investment- 
management industry, and the affiliates; ensuring the continued flexibility 
of the regulatory system to ensure timely response to changing market 
conditions, particularly, deemphasizing maximum and minimum invest- 
ment limits, expanding eligible asset classes, and allowing/increasing  diver- 
sification in foreign securities; developing performance-presentation stan- 
dards (incorporating risk and not focusing only on return); reducing the 
administrative costs of the system; continuing efforts at enhancing disclo- 
sure; and focusing on the education of the participants in the system (both 
those in charge of oversight and the individual affiliates), particularly in 
the areas of risk and the need for a longer-term horizon in decision mak- 
ing and in judging performance. 
References 
Grandolini, G., and L. Cerda. 1998. The  1997pension reform  in Mexico. Policy 
Research Working Paper no. 1933. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June. 
Latin American  pension systems: Investing for the 21st century.  1998. Seminar 
organized by the Investment Management Department and the Economic De- 
velopment Institute, World Bank, Washington, D.C. This Page Intentionally Left Blank